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STALKING OR TALKING?
AN ANALYSIS OF STATE V. SHACKELFORD, STALKING,
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Lindsay Byers*

According to the U.S. Department of Justice,
approximately 3.4 million adults1 are stalked every year in the
United States.2 About half of these victims experience at least
one “unwanted contact per week.”3 Additionally, around one in
four stalking victims report some form of cyberstalking, or
stalking behaviors via the Internet or social media, with eightythree percent reporting e-mail as a medium in which they’ve
experienced stalking.4 The effects of stalking are not to be
understated, as victims report symptoms including, but not
limited to, “stress-related health problems,” difficulty falling or
staying asleep, anxiety, decreased perceptions of safety at home,
and “feelings of losing self, negative perceptions of self, and selfblame.”5 Though stalking seriously affects both men and
women, about seventy-eight percent of stalking victims are
women.6 Mary,7 whose story is highlighted in State v.
Shackelford,8 is one of those women.
Stories of stalking are not uncommon, and neither are
challenges to state anti-stalking statutes. States have long faced
constitutional challenges to their state stalking statutes,
specifically on First Amendment grounds.9 Stories like Mary’s,
and the N.C. Court of Appeal’s decision in her case against her
stalker, have illuminated what may be an express tension
between protecting people’s First Amendment freedom of speech
* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2021, University of North Carolina School of Law; Chief
Articles and Notes Editor, First Amendment Law Review Vol. 19.
1
Persons aged 18 or older.
2
KATRINA BAUM, SHANNAN CATALANO, MICHAEL RAND, & KRISTINA ROSE,
STALKING VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Jan. 2009),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ovw/legacy/2012/08/15/bjs-stalkingrpt.pdf.
3
Id. (emphasis added).
4
Id.
5
Melvin Huang, Keeping Stalkers at Bay in Texas, 15 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 53, 61 (2009).
6
Id.
7
The victim’s actual name has been changed here and in court documents in order to
protect her identity.
8
825 S.E. 2d 689 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019).
9
See infra Section III.A.
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and protecting victims of stalking. In State v. Shackelford,10 Mary’s
stalker’s convictions arising from his Internet posts about her
were vacated because the court concluded his posts were First
Amendment protected speech.11
If the court remains in the shadows when it comes to
constitutional and technological advances (almost all state
stalking statutes were drafted before the rise of social media),
decisions such as State v. Shackelford could result in two different
yet concerning realities. First, this may open the door for more
behavior previously defined as stalking to be protected by the
First Amendment and, thus, result in little to no protections for
victims of stalking. Conversely, in a haste to fervently protect
victims, courts may seriously step on the toes of the First
Amendment such that more traditionally protected speech may
be punishable under stalking statutes.
Shackelford shed light on the fact that North Carolina’s
stalking statute very well may be susceptible to one of those two
concerning realities. This Note will articulate the possible
reasons for concern with North Carolina’s stalking statute and
what the implications of the statute post-Shackelford could mean
for the future of both stalking victims’ rights and the First
Amendment rights of North Carolinians. Ultimately, this Note
will conclude that, to avoid running afoul of the First
Amendment, North Carolina’s stalking statute should be
amended to be more narrow in scope. At the same time, North
Carolina’s civil remedies, such as no-contact orders, should be
expanded in scope to ensure adequate protections for victims of
stalking. This Note will reach this conclusion by starting with an
in-depth analysis of State v. Shackelford in Section I, moving to a
discussion of the First Amendment issues at play in Section II,
examining the tensions between robust protections of the First
Amendment and robust protections of victims in Section III, and
finally articulating a recommendation for remedying the issue in
Section IV.

10
11

Id.
See id. at 702.
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I. STATE V. SHACKELFORD CASE ANALYSIS
A. Facts and Background
In October of 2018, State v. Shackelford came before the
North Carolina Court of Appeals.12 Defendant Brady Lorenzo
Shackelford appealed his conviction of four counts of felony
stalking on the grounds that the convictions were based
“primarily upon the content of posts made by him on his Google
Plus account” and thus were speech protected by the First
Amendment.13 The Court agreed, and Shackelford’s convictions
were vacated.14
Shackelford met the victim, referred to as “Mary,” in
April 2015 at a church in Charlotte where Mary was employed.15
The two were seated at the same table and “briefly made small
talk in a group setting.”16 The two did not communicate beyond
this until a couple weeks later when Shackelford sent Mary an
email, asking for help with a matter related to Shackelford’s
company.17 Mary agreed to help, and the two set a time to meet.18
Shackelford sent another email that same night, giving Mary
more information about his company, and stated he would pay
her “100K out of the convertible note proceeds AND take [her]
out to dinner at any restaurant in Charlotte.”19 This email “set
off a lot of red flags” for Mary and, thinking that his intentions
were not professional, she promptly emailed Shackelford to
cancel their meeting and informed her boss about their
exchange.20 In response, Shackelford sent Mary a five-page
handwritten letter to her work address that included statements
like Shackelford calling Mary his “soul mate,” saying he was
“highly attracted” to her and asking her to go on a date with
him.21 After Mary did not respond to this letter, Shackelford sent
a second handwritten letter, this time to her home address.22 In
this letter, Shackelford first apologized for sending it to Mary’s
12

Id. at 691.
Id.
14
Id. at 702.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 691.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 691–92.
22
Id.
13
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home address even though she never gave him her address and
concluded with instructing Mary to either go on a date with him
or tell him to leave her alone.23 Later, the reverend at the church
where Mary worked and where Mary and Shackelford first met,
contacted Shackelford to warn him that there could be legal
ramifications if he did not stop contacting Mary.24
Following his conversation with the reverend,
Shackelford did not send Mary any emails or letters.25 However,
in June 2015, Mary noticed that Shackelford had begun making
social media posts about her on his Google Plus account.26 The
dates of the posts showed that they were made both before and
after Shackelford’s conversation with the reverend.27 While these
posts were not made directly to Mary, they mentioned her by
name and were posted publicly, so that any user of Google Plus
could read them.28 Mary blocked Shackelford’s account on
Google Plus, but he continued to post about her using her initials
and abbreviated versions of her name.29
In addition to using Mary’s initials and abbreviated
versions of her name, Shackelford frequently referred to her as
“a woman at my church” in his online posts.30 On June 19,
Shackelford wrote that “a woman from [his] church” was driving
him “bat crazy” and that she was “the first thing” he saw when
he “w[o]ke up in the morning” and the last thing he saw when
“lay[ing] down at night.”31 On June 28, Shackelford posted again
about Mary saying that he was “feeling depressed” because he
wants the woman from his church “really, really bad” but that
she didn’t want him.32 On July 19, Shackelford wrote “there is
only one woman that I want, and her initials are [Mary’s
initials].”33 In this post, he continued to write, “[e]ven though we
aren’t dating yet, you might as well mark me down as being in a
relationship because I am not interested in other women.”34
23

Id.
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
24
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On August 13, Shackelford sent a box of cupcakes to
Mary’s office.35 This prompted Mary to file a police report that
day because she “felt like she was being stalked.”36 Based on the
police report, a warrant against Shackelford on a charge of
misdemeanor stalking was issued by Detective Stephen Todd,
and Shackelford was arrested the next day and subsequently
released on bail.37 On the same day of his arrest, and in the
following days, Shackelford posted three more times about Mary
on his Google Plus account.38 On August 16, part of a lengthy
post by Shackelford read:
How do you know when something is not meant
for you if you give up at the first sign of difficulty?
Sometimes, God places difficulties in our lives
because he wants us to be persistent . . . . If every
guy let go of the girl who turned him down the first
time, then there would be lots of marriages that
never took place because he wasn’t persistent.39
Later that same day, Shackelford posted again, this time
speaking of courting “three Venus in Scorpios over the years”
which lead to him doing research about “Scorpios and Venus in
Scorpios.”40 Shackelford mentioned an article he came across
during this research that he found particularly interesting, as it
read, “[t]he author was talking about their obsessiveness and
stated, ‘Don’t run away (you’ll only be stalked).’”41 In his post,
Shackelford said he was drawn to this statement because he “saw
[that] behavior in all three women” and that the “Scorpio
Ascendant in [him] completely understood where they were
coming from.”42
On August 21, Mary filed a petition for a no-contact order
against Shackelford, which prohibited him from contacting or
“posting any information about [Mary] on social media.”43
35

Id. at 693.
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
36
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Subsequently, Shackelford continued to post about Mary
multiple times, often referring to her as his “future wife.”44
Shackelford also sent two emails to a close friend of Mary’s
explicitly referring to Mary and to the court orders Mary
obtained against Shackelford.45 In the first email, sent on
November 24, Shackelford said to Mary’s friend, “You were
present in the courtroom when [Mary] obtained a protective
order against me, so why would you even add me to your
[Google Plus] circles if I am supposedly stalking [Mary]?”46
Shackelford continued by saying that Mary had a “moral
responsibility” to tell the truth about why she charged
Shackelford and that Mary’s friend should “encourage” Mary to
“tell the truth” when they go to court.47 In the second email, sent
on December 18, Shackelford told Mary’s friend about his plans
to take a polygraph test on CNN “to prove that he had ‘talked to
God over 20 times and seen his face 5 times’” which, according
to his plan, would ultimately culminate in Mary telling the judge
that Shackelford was “a righteous man and was in no way a
threat towards her.”48 Mary’s friend forwarded both emails to
Detective Todd.49
Based on Shackelford’s Google Plus posts about Mary
and the emails to Mary’s friend, Detective Todd obtained an
arrest warrant against Shackelford for felony stalking on
December 24, 2015.50 Shackelford was indicted for nine total
counts of felony stalking in April 2016.51 He moved to dismiss
the charges on the ground that his social media posts that gave
rise to these charges were protected speech under the First
Amendment.52 The trial court dismissed four of the stalking
charges and referred to the language in the no-contact order
prohibiting Shackelford from posting about Mary as possibly
unconstitutional.53 On August 18, 2017, Shackelford was
convicted of each of the remaining four stalking charges.54
Shackelford filed an appeal challenging all four convictions,
44

Id. at 693–94.
Id. at 694.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
See id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 694–95.
54
Id. at 695.
45
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stating that they should have been dismissed as unconstitutional
under the First Amendment because the charges were “based—
either in whole or in part—upon the content of his Google Plus
posts” which were protected speech.55 Shackelford further
asserted that the North Carolina stalking statute was
unconstitutional as applied to his specific case.56
B. Reasoning
There are two main types of constitutional challenges—
facial and as-applied.57 While facial challenges contest the
constitutionality of a statute itself, as-applied challenges argue
that the statute, as applied in a specific instance to a specific
person, is unconstitutional.58 Since this was an as-applied
challenge, the court looked only to the specific facts surrounding
Shackelford’s particular circumstances in reaching their
decision.59
In assessing the constitutionality of North Carolina’s
stalking statute60 (hereinafter N.C. stalking statute) as applied to
Shackelford, the court first assessed whether Shackelford’s
convictions triggered the First Amendment, and the court
concluded they did.61 The court next questioned whether the
restriction on Shackelford’s speech imposed by N.C.’s stalking
statute unconstitutionally infringed on his First Amendment
rights.62 The State argued that Shackelford’s social media posts
should not be afforded any First Amendment protections
because they were “integral to criminal conduct” and thus
outside the protections of the First Amendment.63 The court
rejected this argument.64 Ultimately, the court subjected N.C.’s
stalking statute to strict scrutiny and determined that it failed that
high bar.

55

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
57
See id.
58
Id.
59
See id.
60
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3A (2019).
61
Shackelford, 825 S.E.2d at 699.
62
Id. See infra Section II for an in-depth discussion on the First Amendment,
permissible and impermissible restrictions, and appropriate levels of scrutiny to apply
to restrictions.
63
Shackelford, 825 S.E.2d at 697.
64
Id.
56
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Typically, a content-based restriction—one that “cannot
be justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech”65—is subject to strict scrutiny by courts, and thus is
rarely found to be constitutional.66 Here, in order to apply the
N.C. stalking statute to Shackelford’s Google Plus posts, the
court was forced to look to the actual content of those posts, thus
making the statute, as applied to Shackelford, a content-based
restriction on his speech.67 As a content-based restriction on
speech, the application of the stalking statute was subject to strict
scrutiny, and it could not withstand such a high level of
scrutiny.68 Thus, the court concluded that the application of
N.C.’s stalking statute to Shackelford’s social media posts
constituted a violation of his First Amendment rights and
vacated all four of Shackelford’s felony stalking convictions.69
II. FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS
A. First Amendment Primer
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
guarantees that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .”70 The Supreme Court has expressed that
“above all else, the First Amendment means that government
has no power to restrict [speech or] expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”71 The First
Amendment is incorporated against the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment.72
The First Amendment’s freedom of expression applies to
speech and may also apply to conduct insofar as it is expressive.73
Conduct comes into the purview of First Amendment protection
when it “possesses sufficient communicative elements[.]”74
Communication via posting on the Internet does not lose First
Amendment protections simply because it involves the “act” of
65

Id. at 699.
See infra notes 85–87 and accompanying text for more on strict scrutiny.
67
Shackelford, 825 S.E.2d at 699.
68
Id. at 699–702.
69
Id. at 702.
70
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
71
Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
72
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
73
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
74
Id.
66
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posting online, nor does it receive lesser protections merely
because the speech occurs online.75 Regardless of subject matter,
posting on the Internet “can constitute speech as surely as
stapling flyers to bulletin boards or distributing pamphlets to
passersby—activities long protected by the First Amendment.”76
These protections extend “to all new media and forms of
communication that progress might make available[.]”77
When analyzing a regulation under the First
Amendment, it is important to first consider whether the
regulation is content-based or content-neutral. A regulation is
content-based if the law “applies to particular speech because of
the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.”78
However, regulations that appear content-neutral on their face
may also be considered content-based restrictions if the law
“cannot be justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech.”79 While regulations that are content-neutral
are subject to a form of intermediate scrutiny,80 content-based
regulations receive more rigorous treatment.81 Content-based
regulations on speech, or “regulations which permit the
[g]overnment to discriminate on the basis of the content of the
message,” require the government to look directly to the content
of the speech in order to decide whether to regulate it.82 This
“raises the specter that the government may effectively drive
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.”83 The First
75

State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 818 (N.C. 2016).
Id. at 817.
77
Id. at 818.
78
State v. Shackelford, 825 S.E.2d 689, 699 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019).
79
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2222 (2015).
80
Intermediate scrutiny is a level of scrutiny that lies between strict scrutiny, which is
incredibly hard to overcome, and rational basis review, which is much easier to
overcome. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
“[R]egulations that are unrelated to the content of speech” are typically subject to the
intermediate level of scrutiny. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
Regulations subject to intermediate scrutiny will typically be sustained if they
“further[] an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
81
See Shackelford, 825 at 697.
82
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 116 (1991).
83
Id. The concern over driving viewpoints from the marketplace is largely based on
the “marketplace of ideas” theory of First Amendment jurisprudence, articulated by
Justice Holmes. The marketplace of ideas is the idea that the First Amendment
creates a universe where the best ideas prevail, where the weaker ideas naturally are
76
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Amendment is intended to place “this sort of discrimination
beyond the power of the government.”84 Thus, “[c]ontent-based
regulations are presumptively invalid” and are subject to strict
scrutiny.85 In order to satisfy strict scrutiny, the restrictions must
be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.86
This is an extremely high standard and, as a general matter, most
restrictions fail to satisfy strict scrutiny.87
However, there are some forms of speech that fall outside
the scope of the First Amendment and are not afforded
protection.88 Some categories of speech not protected under the
First Amendment include, but are not limited to, incitement of
violence,89 speech integral to criminal conduct,90 “fighting
words,”91 and child pornography.92 The Supreme Court has long
held that “otherwise proscribable criminal conduct” does not
receive First Amendment protections simply because the
conduct “happens to involve the written or spoken word.”93 In
other words, the constitutional freedom of speech does not
extend immunity to “speech or writing used as an integral part
of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.”94 For
example, bans on child pornography will typically pass
constitutional muster because the speech being regulated is
“intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children.”95 Contentbased restrictions on speech are typically valid if the underlying
speech itself falls into one of these categories of unprotected
speech.96

phased out or rejected. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes,
J., dissenting). Justice Holmes articulated this in his dissent to Abrams by saying “the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market and that truth is the only ground upon which [individual] wishes safely
can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our constitution.” Id. at 630.
84
Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 116.
85
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
86
Shackelford, 825 S.E.2d at 697.
87
See id. at 700.
88
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
89
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
90
See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
91
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568.
92
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
93
State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 817 (N.C. 2016).
94
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761–62.
95
See id. at 758–59.
96
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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B. First Amendment Implications in State v. Shackelford
The First Amendment’s protection of speech does not
extend to “speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct
in violation of a criminal statute.”97 In Shackelford, one of the
State’s main arguments was that Shackelford’s social media
posts were integral to criminal conduct because they amounted
to a violation of North Carolina’s stalking statute and, as a result,
should not receive First Amendment protections.98 Since his
speech was outside of the First Amendment’s protections, the
State argued, even if the N.C. stalking statute as applied to
Shackelford was a content-based restriction, the court still should
not invalidate the statute since the underlying speech is
unprotected.99 The court rejected this argument, relying on
precedent100 to distinguish statutes that “incidentally punish
speech that is integral to a criminal violation” from statutes
where “the speech itself is the criminal violation.”101 Here, the
court reasoned, Shackelford’s social media posts were not
integral to the violation of N.C.’s stalking statute, but rather
Shackelford’s posts themselves were the criminal violation.102
The court further determined that the stalking statute, as
applied to Shackelford, constituted a content-based restriction on
his speech.103 The N.C. stalking statute prohibits
communications or conduct that would “cause a reasonable
person to . . . [s]uffer substantial emotional distress by placing
that person in fear of death, bodily injury, or continued
harassment.”104 Thus, communications or conduct that the
recipient finds pleasing are not prohibited, while those that cause
the recipient to suffer substantial emotional distress are
prohibited. Therefore, determining whether or not Shackelford’s
posts were prohibited under this language of the statute could not
be done without referring to the content of those posts. Thus, the

97

State v. Shackelford, 825 S.E.2d 689, 698 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Ferber, 458
U.S. at 761–62).
98
Id. at 697.
99
Id.
100
People v. Relerford, 104 N.E.3d 341 (Ill. 2017).
101
Shackelford, 825 S.E.2d at 699.
102
See id. at 698.
103
See id.
104
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3A (2020).
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court determined that, as applied to Shackelford, the stalking
statute constituted a content-based restriction.105
Since the statute imposes a content-based protection on
protected speech, the statute as applied to Shackelford must
survive strict scrutiny in order to be constitutional. The North
Carolina Supreme Court has explained that to survive strict
scrutiny for this type of content-based restriction, the State “must
show not only that a challenged content[-]based measure
addresses the identified harm, but that the enactment provides
the least restrictive means of doing so.”106 In Shackelford, the
Court raised specific concerns that the application of the N.C.
stalking statute to Shackelford’s posts was not the least restrictive
means to accomplish the State’s asserted goal of “preventing the
escalation of stalking into more dangerous behavior . . . .”107 The
court relied on the fact that Mary had already sought and
received a no-contact order to show that there were less
restrictive means (i.e. more strict enforcement of the terms of the
no-contact order) by which the State could have achieved its
asserted interest.108 Therefore, the stalking statute as applied to
Shackelford failed the strict scrutiny standard and was
unconstitutional.109
C. First Amendment Implications Posed by North Carolina’s
Stalking Statute
While stalking is conduct that the N.C. stalking statute
aims to punish, the language of the statute brings in expressive,
communicative conduct as well.110 Thus, the First Amendment
may be implicated by the statute. North Carolina’s stalking
statute provides, in pertinent part, that:
[a] defendant is guilty of stalking if the defendant
willfully on more than one occasion harasses
another person without legal purpose or willfully
engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific
105

See Shackelford, 825 S.E.2d at 699.
Id. at 700.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 701.
110
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3A (2020), invalidated by State v. Shackelford, 825
S.E.2d 689 (N.C. 2018).
106
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person without legal purpose and the defendant
knows or should know that the harassment or the
course of conduct would cause a reasonable
person to . . . [s]uffer substantial emotional distress
by placing that person in fear of death, bodily
injury, or continued harassment.111
The statute defines “course of conduct” as:
[t]wo or more acts, including, but not limited to,
acts in which the stalker directly, indirectly, or
through third parties, by any action, method,
device, or means, is in the presence of, or follows,
monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, or
communicates to or about a person, or interferes
with a person's property.112
As Judge Murphy’s concurrence in State v. Shackelford
suggests, the language “communicates to or about a person” in
the statute’s definition of course of conduct is a major point of
concern under the First Amendment.113 There is an important
distinction between communications directed toward a specific
person, like through telephone calls or mailings, and public
postings that are not directed specifically to a person. Sending an
unwilling recipient something in the mail, such as Shackelford
sending cupcakes to Mary, is non-speech conduct and thus does
not raise First Amendment concerns.114 However, public
postings on social media do not constitute “conduct” and thus
may come into First Amendment territory.115
All four counts of stalking on which Shackelford was
convicted were premised, either partially or wholly, on the
online posts Shackelford made about Mary.116 While these posts
were undoubtedly about Mary, they were never sent directly to
her or anyone else; rather they were posted publicly.117 Due to
the language of the N.C. stalking statute, Shackelford’s posts,
without more, were enough to support his stalking
111

Id. § 14-277.3A(c)(2) (emphasis added).
Id. § 14-277.3A(b)(1).
113
See Shackelford, 825 S.E.2d at 704 (Murphy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
114
See id. at 703.
115
See id.
116
See id. at 694 (majority opinion).
117
See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 25–34, 38–44.
112

112
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convictions.118 This means that Shackelford’s speech online
alone was being punished, not some other act.119 This was the
basis for the reason that the Court in Shackelford rejected the
State’s argument that Shackelford’s posts should fall within the
“speech integral to criminal conduct” exception to First
Amendment protections.120 Rather than the N.C. stalking statute
incidentally punishing Shackelford’s speech because it is integral
to the criminal violation, the language of this statute actually
makes the speech itself the criminal violation.121
The issues with the N.C. stalking statute in Shackelford are
quite similar to those in Illinois’ stalking statute, challenged in
People v. Relerford,122 and North Carolina’s cyberbullying statute,
challenged in State v. Bishop.123 Both of these statutes were
challenged as facially unconstitutional under the First
Amendment, and the court in Shackelford relied heavily on both
cases in order to come to their conclusion.124
Under the Illinois stalking statute125 at issue in Relerford,
“two or more nonconsensual communications to or about a
person that the defendant knows or should know would cause a
reasonable person to suffer emotional distress” are enough to
constitute stalking.126 Much like the pertinent portion of the N.C.
stalking statute, the defendant in Relerford contested the aspect of
Illinois’ stalking statute that punishes communications “to or
about” a person.127 The Relerford court held that the contested
stalking statute provision, as well as a similarly worded provision
in Illinois’ cyberstalking statute,128 was facially unconstitutional
under the First Amendment because they were both
overbroad.129 A statute may be unconstitutionally overbroad if a
“substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional.”130
118
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This was the case for Illinois’ stalking statute since it “reaches a
host of social interactions that a person would find distressing
but are clearly understood to fall within the protections of the
[F]irst [A]mendment.”131
The defendant in Bishop challenged North Carolina’s
cyberbullying statute132 which made it unlawful “for any person
to use a computer or computer network to [p]ost or encourage
others to post on the Internet private, personal, or sexual
information pertaining to a minor [w]ith the intent to intimidate
or torment a minor.”133 Much like the stalking statute at issue in
Shackelford, North Carolina’s cyberbullying statute was found to
create a content-based restriction on speech protected by the First
Amendment, and it failed strict scrutiny, again like Shackelford,
because the statue was not the least restrictive means to
accomplish the governmental interest of “protecting minors from
[] potential harm.”134
The similarities in statutory language as well as the
courts’ reasoning and decisions in Shackelford, Relerford, and
Bishop are striking and highlight the potential troubles N.C.’s
stalking statute may face. Perhaps the most prominent issue with
N.C.’s stalking statute lies in the distinction between what
Eugene Volokh calls “one-to-one speech vs. one-to-many
speech.”135
Volokh defines one-to-one speech as “speech said to a
particular person in a context where the recipient appears not to
want to hear it, whether because the recipient has expressly
demanded that the speech stop or because the speaker intends to
annoy or offend the recipient.”136 Examples of one-to-one speech
would be sending letters and other mail to people, phone calls to
a person, and communication of the like. Restrictions on this
type of speech, such as in stalking and harassment laws, have
traditionally been upheld against First Amendment
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challenges.137 One large reason for restrictions on one-to-one
speech being upheld is the fact that since the speech is typically
to one, or a limited number, of unwilling listeners, restricting that
speech still leaves the speaker open to “communicate to other,
potentially willing listeners.”138 This poses less of a threat to the
marketplace of ideas.139
Conversely, one-to-many speech, like signs, words on
clothing, picketing, flyers, etc., is generally protected under the
First Amendment.140 While some would-be viewers or listeners
of this one-to-many speech may be unwilling or offended by the
speech, “[s]o long as some of the viewers are likely to be open to
the message, the message remains protected . . . .”141 This is
because if some listeners are open to the speech, then restricting
it would restrict “constitutionally valuable communication to
willing listeners . . . .”142 Moreover, one-to-many speech that is
critical of one person falls under this same umbrella of protection
because, while the subject of criticism is likely to see and be
offended by the message, other readers may find it to be
valuable.143 In all, restricting one-to-many communication
restricts the availability of that communication to many willing
listeners, which offends the First Amendment.144
Not only is N.C.’s stalking statute at controversy in
Shackelford extremely akin to those statutes that were held
unconstitutional in Relerford and Bishop, some of the language
also falls within Volokh’s conception of one-to-many speech.
The language in N.C.’s stalking statute that punishes
“communicat[ing] about a person”145 is punishing one-to-many
speech. Though the Internet posts in Shackelford were
undoubtedly about a specific person (the victim), they were made
publicly, to a large audience, some of whom may have been
interested in reading them. In other words, as Volokh articulated,
the fact that some of Shackelford’s online acquaintances were
likely willing readers of his posts (and thus listeners to his
137
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speech), makes those posts more “constitutionally valuable
communication.”146 Though in this specific instance it might be
more difficult to view Shackelford’s posts as valuable, it is easy
to imagine a wealth of scenarios where public posts about a
person that could offend N.C.’s stalking statute would be
considered highly valuable, like criticizing a public figure, for
example. With this in mind, and in the wake of the Relerford and
Bishop decisions, it is likely that N.C.’s stalking statute,
specifically the language “communicates to or about a person”147
is at risk of being found facially unconstitutional under the First
Amendment.
III. TENSIONS BETWEEN PROTECTING FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS AND PROTECTING VICTIMS
Anti-stalking statutes have largely been introduced by
state legislatures attempting to address and remedy “some of the
limitations found with civil protection orders and related
statutes.”148 In response to the murder of Rebecca Schaffer149 by
a stalker in 1989, California was the first state to pass antistalking legislation, and all other states, plus the District of
Columbia, quickly followed suit.150 Following the passage of
California’s stalking statute in 1990, many “legal scholars,
advocates, and legislators predicted a series of constitutional
challenges” would soon unfold, and they were right.151 Due to
the “breadth of conduct potentially involved in stalking, antistalking statutes need to be relatively broad to be effective.”152
146
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However, this breadth combined with the fact that stalking acts
often include speech and/or expressive conduct means that these
statutes must be carefully constructed, so as not to infringe on
anyone’s First Amendment rights.153 This construction is easier
said than done, and in the two decades since California passed
the first anti-stalking statute, state stalking statutes have faced
numerous constitutional challenges, many on First Amendment
grounds.154
Since state stalking statutes were introduced due to the
“inability of existing legal remedies to protect . . . victims from
their stalkers,”155 these challenges have made one thing clear—
there may be an express tension between the First Amendment
freedom of speech and protecting victims of stalking, such that
robust protections of one may be at the cost of the other.
A. History of First Amendment Challenges to Stalking Statutes
State stalking statutes have been no stranger to
constitutional challenges over the past two decades, with the two
most common arguments against the statutes being that they are
too vague or that they are overbroad because they “criminalize
what is otherwise constitutionally protected expressive
activity.”156
1. Upheld as Constitutional
Though anti-stalking and similar statutes have been
constitutionally challenged since their enactment, courts are not
as quick to invalidate these regulations as it may appear. The
following are a few cases in which anti-stalking statutes have
been challenged under the First Amendment and survived those
challenges. Though these decisions do not necessarily mean the
regulations in question are safe from being rejected under a
ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE VICE PRESIDENT (Aug. 1999),
https://webharvest.gov/peth04/20041022072652/http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm.
153
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154
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constitutional challenge in the future, they may shed light on
what is needed for a regulation to survive such challenges.
To start, a slew of constitutional challenges cropped up in
1995, likely as a result of the enactment of the first anti-stalking
statutes. In large part, many of these general constitutional
challenges resulted in the statutes being declared constitutional,
“or that such a finding was supportable.”157
In 2014, a Wisconsin Appellate Court affirmed the
convictions of a defendant under the state stalking statute158 in
State v. Maier.159 Defendant Maier’s stalking charges were “based
on two letters [he] sent to jurors who had found him guilty in a
prior criminal proceeding in 2006.”160 Maier asserted that the
statute under which he was convicted of stalking was
unconstitutional because the letters he sent did not amount to a
true threat.161 Speech that is considered a true threat falls under
the umbrella of speech that is not protected by the First
Amendment.162 However, Maier argued, since his speech wasn’t
a true threat, then it was protected by the First Amendment, and
thus his convictions under the stalking statute were
unconstitutional.163 The court rejected this argument and stated
that in order to prove the initial stalking charges, the State had to
prove that Maier’s “intentional course of conduct would have
caused a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress or
to fear bodily injury or death to herself” or another family
member.164 This, the court reasoned, “aptly describes a ‘true
threat’ that does not enjoy constitutional protection.”165 Thus, in
satisfying the language of the statute, Maier’s speech amounted

157
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to a true threat that was not protected by the First Amendment.166
Therefore, his First Amendment challenge failed.167
The reasoning in Maier could demonstrate a possible
benefit of narrowing the language of N.C.’s stalking statute. If
the statute were precise enough to only target unprotected
speech, like true threats, it likely would survive First Amendment
challenges, quite similar to Shackelford’s.
Quite recently, in 2018, the First Circuit rejected a First
Amendment challenge to a federal anti-stalking law in United
States v. Ackell.168 The defendant, Ackell, was convicted of
stalking for inappropriate online and text communications with
a younger female.169 He argued that the federal anti-stalking
statute violated his First Amendment freedom of speech because
it targeted speech rather than conduct.170 Ackell insisted that
since the statute required him to use “the mail, any interactive
computer service or electronic communication service or
electronic communication system of interstate commerce . . .” it
was targeting his speech.171 The court disagreed, and stated that
although the statute “does name common means of
communication . . . one could use to commit the offenses it
defines, it does not necessarily follow that the statute targets
speech.”172 The court also further reasoned that to the extent the
statute might target speech, it is unprotected speech, such as true
threats.173
A similar lesson as that learned from Maier can likely be
learned from Ackell as well. Again, it appears that a narrow
construction of N.C.’s stalking statute such that the only speech
it targets is unprotected speech would be beneficial to survive
First Amendment challenges.
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2. Declared Unconstitutional
Not every regulation challenged under the First
Amendment has survived, however. The following cases are just
a few in the line of those where a regulation has been declared,
either facially or as-applied, unconstitutional under the First
Amendment. These cases not only set the stage for the ultimate
decision in Shackelford but serve as guidance to what may be the
future for N.C.’s current stalking statute if not amended.
In a 1996 case, Long v. Texas,174 the provision concerning
stalking in Texas’s state harassment statute was declared facially
unconstitutional for vagueness.175 Specifically, the defendant
argued that the following section of the statute was too vague:
A person commits an offense if, with intent to
harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or
embarrass another, he: [] on more than one
occasion engages in conduct directed specifically
toward the other person, including following that
person, that is reasonably likely to harass, annoy,
alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass that person .
. .176
The court agreed that this was too vague, noting that this
portion of the statute “covers any conduct in which a person
could possibly engage.”177 It is possible that the drafters of this
language considered future issues with this statute, as they
included an affirmative defense for “constitutionally protected
activity.”178 Presumably, this could be a solution to First
Amendment challenges to the statute. However, the Long court
tells us otherwise, and explains that “a general savings provision
‘cannot substantially operate to save an otherwise invalid statute
. . . .’”179 Thus, the court declared the entire statute here
unconstitutional.180
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In the same vein, a year later, a landmark Supreme Court
case Reno v. ACLU,181 held the Communications Decency Act
(CDA) unconstitutional under the First Amendment as a vague,
content-based regulation that has an “obvious chilling effect on
free speech.”182 The CDA was enacted by Congress in order to
“prevent minors from gaining access to sexually explicit
materials on the Internet.”183 The Act prohibited “any individual
from knowingly transmitting ‘obscene or indecent’ messages to
a recipient under the age of 18” as well as knowingly displaying
“patently offensive materials in a manner available to those
under 18.”184 The Court found issue specifically with the CDA’s
use of the terms “indecent” and “patently offensive” because it
was open-ended and covered a large range of “material with
serious educational or other value.”185 The court reasoned that
unlike obscenity, for example, “indecency has not been defined
to exclude works of serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.”186 Thus, the language of CDA was vague enough to
punish speech that is not only protected by the First Amendment,
but that could be quite valuable.187
Skipping ahead a few years to 2011, United States v.
Cassidy188 decided, much like Shackelford, that the federal stalking
statute under which the defendant was convicted was
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.189 The defendant
in this case violated the relevant statute190 by “us[ing] an
interactive computer service” to post messages which “caused
substantial emotional distress to a person . . . .”191 Much like
N.C.’s stalking statute, the court took specific issue with the
breadth of this language, noting that “the First Amendment
protects speech even when the subject or manner of expression
is uncomfortable and challenges conventional religious beliefs,
political attitudes, or standards of good taste.”192 Moreover, the
181
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court noted that the “U.S. Supreme Court has consistently
classified emotionally distressing or outrageous speech as
protected” and that “[s]uch speech cannot be restricted simply
because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.”193 Ultimately, the
court concluded that under the First Amendment, the statute was
unconstitutional as applied to the defendant.194
Quite like the line of cases that withstood First
Amendment challenges, these cases that failed to pass
constitutional muster show a clear trend of courts preferring
more narrow, specific language in stalking statutes. Thus, in
attempting to remedy N.C.’s current stalking statute such that it
is not declared unconstitutional, it will likely need to be
narrowed. This, of course, begs the question of how to narrow
the language of N.C.’s stalking statute, without also decreasing
protections for stalking victims.
B. Robust First Amendment Protections and Robust Protections of
Victims at the Cost of the Other?
Though the First Amendment supplies rights of the
utmost importance, it is also imperative to remember in
discussing these issues that “the right to be free from harassment”
is also an important protection.195 In the Shackelford opinion,
Judge Davis notes that this case “aptly demonstrates [the]
difficult issues [that] arise in attempting to balance, on the one
hand, society’s laudable desire to protect individuals from
emotional injury resulting from unwanted and intrusive
comments with, on the other hand, the free speech rights of
persons seeking to express themselves on social media.”196
However, while there exists decades of case law establishing the
importance and intricacies of protecting free speech,197 there is a
mass of information showing the importance of stalking statutes
193
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in adequately protecting victims,198 yet guidance on how to
properly draft and enforce those statutes without offending the
First Amendment is wanting. This gray area leads to many parts
of stalking statutes being invalidated as unconstitutional, leaving
victims with less protections and without alternate avenues for
recourse.
Prior to the enactment of stalking statutes, the most
common protections for people being stalked were injunctions or
restraining orders.199 However, as aforementioned,200 this
remedy proved to be ineffective in providing “any meaningful
protection.”201 Injunctions and restraining orders can be difficult
to obtain, since many states require a showing of physical
abuse.202 Since stalking often does not include physical abuse,
this is yet another barrier to victims gaining protection absent a
stalking statute. Moreover, the consequences for breaking these
orders, which is often easily done, are typically minor and
delayed.203 A majority of states only punish a violation of a
protective order with civil contempt, which then leads to victims
of the violated order having to either “obtain an arrest warrant
or petition the court to summon the violator to a contempt
hearing.”204 Even more, the time delays that typically plague
obtaining a contempt hearing or warrant means that victims
were often left with no immediate protection. With the need for
stalking statutes blatantly apparent in order to adequately protect
victims of stalking, it is quite worrisome that these statutes are in
danger of offending the First Amendment.
A recent Supreme Court case out of North Carolina,
Packingham v. North Carolina,205 provides an example, much like
in Shackelford, of the tensions between protecting victims while
also protecting the First Amendment. This decision also provides
persuasive precedent that shows when the two rights—that of
victims and that of freedom of expression—are at odds, the First
Amendment usually wins.206
198
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Packingham concerns Lester Gerard Packingham, who, at
the age of 21, had sexual intercourse with a 13-year-old girl.207
Packingham pleaded guilty to “taking indecent liberties with a
child,” and was required to register as a sex offender because the
crime qualifies as “an offense against a minor.”208 As a registered
sex offender, Packingham was barred under North Carolina
statute, § 14-202.5209 from “gaining access to commercial social
networking sites.”210 A few years later Packingham posted on
social media—a Facebook post regarding a dismissed speeding
ticket—in violation of this statute.211 A member of the Durham,
NC police department discovered this post, and a grand jury
indicted Packingham for his violation of §14-202.5.212
The Supreme Court held that NC statute §14-202.5,
under which Packingham was indicted, was unconstitutional
under the First Amendment.213 The court conceded that the
government had an important interest in “keeping convicted sex
offenders away from vulnerable victims,” but found that the
statute enacted a prohibition “unprecedented in the scope of First
Amendment speech [which] it burdens.”214 The Court went on
to emphasize the importance of social media to the freedom of
speech, by saying that:
Social media allows users to gain access to
information and communicate with one another
about it on any subject that might come to mind.
By prohibiting sex offenders from using these
websites, North Carolina with one broad stroke
bars access to what for many are the principal
sources for knowing current events, checking ads
for employment, speaking and listening in the
modern public square, and otherwise exploring
the vast realms of human thought and knowledge.
These websites can provide perhaps the most powerful
mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or
207
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her voice heard. They allow a person with an
Internet connection to “become a town crier with
a voice that resonates farther than it could from
any soapbox.”215
This specific language from the Supreme Court regarding
the important role social media plays in freedom of speech and
expression is quite telling, not only of the express tensions that
may arise in protecting victims while also protecting everyone’s
First Amendment rights, but of how these tensions will likely
play out in the future as well, especially regarding N.C.’s current
stalking statute. The language of the current stalking statute, as
Shackelford highlights, can be so broadly applied as to prohibit
speech on the Internet. With the strong precedent of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Packingham in mind, two things are clear: (1)
when forced to decide between a protective statute and First
Amendment rights, the Court heavily favors the First
Amendment, and (2) it is imperative to the survival of N.C.’s
stalking statute, as well as to strike a balance between protecting
victims of stalking and protecting First Amendment rights, to
amend the stalking statute.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
On a larger, more holistic scale, the tensions between
freedom of speech and the state’s desire to protect victims of
stalking cannot truly be solved unless the law, and courts, catch
up with modern technology. However, in the meantime, there
are adjustments that the N.C. legislature can make in order to
address the issue presented by Shackelford. These adjustments are
twofold—first, N.C.’s stalking statute should be amended to be
narrower and thus out of First Amendment concern. Second,
civil remedies, such as restraining and no-contact orders, should
both be broadened, and enforced more strictly.
A. Importance of Courts Catching up with Modern Technology
At the forefront of many challenges of stalking statutes
under the First Amendment is the fact that many statutes, and
First Amendment jurisprudence, leave courts and legislatures in
215
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murky waters when it comes to social media. It has been
estimated that the law is “at least five years behind” developing
technology.216 For example, definitions of how the Internet
works in case law as recent as 2007 are completely out of date
now.217 Sherry Honeycutt, who represents stalking victims and is
the legal and policy director for the N.C. Coalition Against
Domestic Violence, has commented on this issue, saying,
“[w]hat [victims] find when they get in court in the criminal
justice system is a system that’s not really set up. We don’t have
laws that are really equipped to prosecute stalking cases on the
basis of online social media speech . . . .”218 This is because,
Honeycutt notes, “[a] lot of our criminal jurisprudence grew at a
time before we had social media.”219 This inability to keep up
with technology inevitably leads to gaps in the law, which only
stand to get wider.220
The answer to how to resolve the tensions between First
Amendment protections and protections of victims in state
stalking statutes is heavily nuanced and complicated, to say the
least. However, the proper balance cannot be stricken unless the
law, and those applying and enforcing the law, catch up with
technological advances.
B. Amend North Carolina’s Stalking Statute
The N.C. Court of Appeals decision in Shackelford leaves
the door open for more constitutional challenges to N.C.’s
stalking statute and the possibility that more victims will see their
stalkers’ convictions vacated. In order to best protect victims and
allow N.C.’s stalking statute to stand on more solid First
Amendment grounds, the statute should be amended. Though
two former district court judges have voiced concern that
amending the statute is inappropriate because the holding in
216
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Shackelford is a narrow one,221 cases and challenges like this one
are extremely likely to keep occurring. In the Shackelford opinion,
Judge Davis noted that courts “will no doubt continue to grapple
with [this] issue[] going forward.”222 Thus, it is imperative that
legislatures amend N.C.’s stalking statute.
Many advocates for victims of stalking, such as Sherry
Honeycutt, also want to see N.C.’s stalking laws change because
they are “outdated,” and the current statute is not really
“equipped to prosecute stalking cases on the basis of online social
media speech . . . .”223 UNC School of Government professor
Shea Denning agrees, saying that in order “to prevent
constitutional challenges, stalking laws need to be updated.”224
As a result of State v. Shackelford, Rep. Lee Zachary
proposed changes to the stalking statute in House Bill 558 that
would change the stalking definition to someone who “observes,
surveils, threatens, or communicates to . . . a person” and
remove the “or about” language.225 Removing this language
would “remove public statements about a person from the
statute’s reach as well as the town-hall business-owner type of
communication referenced in Relerford.”226 Additionally, though
it is important for courts and legislation to “keep up” with
advances in technology, any amendment made to N.C.’s stalking
statute likely should not expressly mention social media in order
to stay on solid First Amendment grounds. In Packingham v.
North Carolina, the N.C. Supreme Court noted that a
“fundamental principle of the First Amendment” is that all
people should “have access to places where they can speak and
listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more.”227
The Court goes on to characterize social media as one of “the
most important places . . . for [this] exchange of views.”228 This
221

Travis Fain, Stalking Code Rewrite Delayed Over Domestic Violence Concerns, WRAL,
(Apr. 10, 2019, 2:05 PM), https://www.wral.com/stalking-code-rewrite-delayedover-domestic-violence-concerns/18318102/.
222
State v. Shackelford, 825 S.E.2d 689, 702 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018).
223
Tolison, supra note 195.
224
Id.
225
Travis Fain, Stalking Code Rewrite Delayed Over Domestic Violence Concerns, WRAL,
(Apr. 10, 2019, 2:05 PM), https://www.wral.com/stalking-code-rewrite-delayedover-domestic-violence-concerns/18318102/.
226
Shea Denning, Court Vacates Stalking Convictions on First Amendment Grounds, N.C.
CRIM. LAW (Mar. 20, 2019, 8:00 PM), https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/courtvacates-stalking-convictions-on-first-amendment-grounds/.
227
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
228
Id. at 1743.

2020]

STALKI NG OR TAL KING

127

leads to the notion that North Carolina courts will likely be very
hesitant to uphold a statute which explicitly references and
places any sort of restriction on the use of social media.
Narrowing the language of N.C.’s stalking statute in order to
exclude speech or expression protected by the First Amendment
has its merits. Namely, it will ensure that the statute is still
relatively broad, but it removes language that may cause courts
to invalidate the statute as a whole. In other words, though
removing the language mentioned above will limit some
behaviors that qualify as stalking, it is likely better than the entire
statute being declared unconstitutional.
It is important to note, however, that there are concerns that
come with making the above proposed amendment to N.C.’s
stalking statute. Sherry Honeycutt mentions that “[a]nyone
who’s worked in victim advocacy in the last ten or fifteen years
understands how devastating social media posts can be for a
victim.”229 While removing the specific language from N.C.’s
stalking statute that concerns communications about a person
rather than directly to them may address the First Amendment
concerns here, the amendment would effectively eliminate
online posts from being considered stalking, which leaves
something to be desired for protecting victims.
C. Increased Protections for Civil Protective Orders
Broadening, and increasing the focus on the availability
and enforcement of civil protections for stalking can help bridge
the gap left from removing the above language from N.C.’s
stalking statute. Today, all jurisdictions offer protective orders
for victims of stalking.230 Though protective orders are “designed
to prevent future violence rather than punish past conduct,” most
states make a violation of these orders a crime.231 This provides
a possible loophole for the First Amendment concerns of N.C.’s
current stalking statute. Though removing the aforementioned
language from the statute makes it more narrow in scope, victims
of stalking will most likely still be able to obtain a protective
order, since they require a lower burden of proof than in criminal
229
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proceedings.232 If the offender then violates that protective order,
the victim then has grounds to seek criminal punishment against
their stalker. This is then an avenue for victims to see similar
remedies offered from criminal cases against their stalkers, but
based on the violation of a protective order, rather than a statute.
If the criminal case is based upon a violation of a civil order
rather than a statute, there is less of a chance for constitutional,
specifically First Amendment, challenges.
Though this portion of my recommendation is logical, it
is nothing but idealistic without proper enforcement of these
protective orders. Without enforcement, protective orders are
“like dollar bills that are not legal tender; they are merely pieces
of paper.”233 Proper and strong enforcement of these protective
orders is imperative because otherwise they offer, at best, “scant
protection” and, at worst, may increase the “victim’s danger by
creating a false sense of security.”234 In fact, one study revealed
that around fifty-eight percent of women reported experiencing
a protective order violation.235 Regardless of the reasons behind
these violations, both officials and courts must be prepared not
only to heavily enforce the weight behind the protective orders,
but also enforce punishment of violations of the orders.
Oregon provides an example of what may be necessary
regarding an increased focus on the enforcement of protective
orders in order to best bridge the gap left from narrowing N.C.’s
stalking statute. Oregon enacted a protective order specific to
stalking in 1993, which was later amended in 2001 in order to
include electronic communications.236 Though meeting the
grounds for stalking in Oregon is a bit harder (which is not
recommended for North Carolina), those who do obtain stalking
protective orders “receive intense enforcement from police
officers, [as] the officers view a violation of a stalking protective
order” as a high offense.237
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V. CONCLUSION
Our rights to freedom of speech and expression, and to
live freely from harassment are both important in living free and
safe lives. However, what are we do to if those two rights
conflict? This is the question posed to courts and legislators in
light of First Amendment challenges to state anti-stalking
statutes, like in State v. Shackelford. In light of the Shackelford
decision, N.C.’s stalking statute may be at risk of being declared
unconstitutional, and thus leave victims of stalking with little to
no recourse. With this in mind, it is imperative that legislators
work to carefully amend N.C.’s stalking statute such that it fully
protects victims while not running afoul of the First Amendment.
For the reasons articulated in this Note, the most effective
remedy for this is twofold (1) amend N.C.’s anti-stalking statute
to be more narrow, removing the language that is questionable
under the First Amendment, and (2) expand civil remedies
available to victims of stalking to fill the gap left from removing
the language in the stalking statute. Careful attention to the new
construction of N.C.’s stalking statute, as well as a strong focus
on enforcing civil remedies for stalking will strengthen
protections for stalking victims, as well as ensure robust
protections of First Amendment rights in North Carolina.

